This monograph assesses the modus operandi of debt negotiations between Egypt and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), using the four agreements of 1987, 1991, 1993, and 1996. Political, technocratic, and individual bargaining factors are considered as possible explanations of processes and outcomes of IMF–Egyptian negotiations. Both the 1987 and the 1991 agreements were suspiciously negotiated, with political factors dominating processes and outcomes. The final two agreements, signed in 1993 and 1996, were less clouded by political factors, allowing for the greater possibility of IMF due process to work. The more than ten-year IMF–Egyptian relationship was not without controversy and difficulty. From the role of the IMF in the American debt forgiveness of Egypt following the Gulf War to the ever-contentious issue of the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, dealing with the IMF has been an important feature of Egypt’s politicking.
Cairo Papers Vol. 26, no. 3